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 2 
Introduction 
 
Owner occupied housing has always been recognised as both a consumption and an 
investment good. In both research and policy, however, it has, until recently, been the 
consumption element (housing as shelter, as service, as meaning-filled home) that has 
attracted most attention. This review addresses the other side of the coin. Housing is not 
unique in being both usable and a potentially appreciating asset (antique clocks, vintage cars 
and old teddy bears have some of the same features), but in Britain – much more so than in 
the USA, for example – housing wealth has become the most valuable, and sometimes the 
only, significant asset many households possess. In Britain today, not only do more people 
have more wealth in their homes than ever before, but this asset is (with a wide range of 
mortgage products at the interface) more ‘spendable’ now than it will ever be again. The cost 
is record levels of indebtedness in an economy driven more by credit than cash. This is the 
background against which any assessment of the changing significance of housing assets, of 
the fragile balance between savings and debt, and of their implications for the future of home 
ownership, must be set.  
 
The discussion which follows begins by documenting three key changes in the economic 
landscape of home ownership in Britain: first, its growing extent and appreciating value; 
second, the increasing fungibility of housing wealth; and finally a (possible) shift in political 
and social attitudes to the asset value of owned housing. Looking to the future, the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders recognises in all these trends ‘the enormous contribution that home 
ownership makes to the social fabric of the UK, the wellbeing of individual households, and 
the policy objective of self provision’ (Anderson 2004, p. 12). But as with any housing 
strategy (and, arguably, more so than with many), its effects are uneven, and its benefits come 
with both risks and costs. This paper is primarily concerned with how to identify, limit and 
manage these risks and costs for individuals as well as for economies and societies.  
 
The second section of this report therefore contains an overview of some of the individual 
and systemic risks associated with the changing character of housing assets in the UK. For 
individuals, these risks include: unequal access to, the financial rewards of home ownership; 
high levels of indebtedness combined with low social protection; and dependence on a narrow 
investment portfolio. Systemic risks associated with the wealth effects of owner occupation 
have a bearing on the wider economy (not least because of the way instability in house prices 
interacts with monetary policy). They also pose a challenge to politics (questioning a national 
housing strategy based on the sustainability of owner occupation), and have environmental 
repercussions (impacting on the future quality and condition of the housing stock).  
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The last section of the paper is concerned with the prospects for mitigating the risks 
associated with the asset value of home ownership. Rather than providing a list of key risks 
and possible strategies (which has to an extent been done before) this section is organised 
around the relative merits of two broad models. These models are not mutually exclusive. 
They both aim to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks associated with home 
ownership over the next ten to twenty years. However, they envisage rather different 
scenarios for the future of owner occupation. The first is an evolutionary model. It aims to 
promote the fairness and accountability of lenders while enhancing the knowledge and 
capability of consumers. The second might be termed a ‘care-full markets’ model. This is 
about the prospects for adopting a more flexible and imaginative, less individualised, and 
ultimately trans- or post- tenure approach to the wealth accumulated through owner 
occupation.  
 
 
Housing assets: reshaping the economic landscape 
 
i) The rise and rise of owner occupation 
Working across almost any timescale, it is hard to overstate the shift in the extent and 
magnitude of housing wealth in Britain. In less than 100 years a nation of renters has been 
transformed into a society of home owner/buyers, so that, from a low of 10 per cent in 1914, 
owner occupation had reached 69% by 2001 (rising to 85% among mid-life households). In 
the half century 1951 to 2001, the housing stock as a whole grew by 80% while the number of 
homes in owner occupation increased by 320%. Home ownership is now more extensive than 
it has ever been in England and Wales. And as far as households are concerned there is still 
some way to go: 76% of households want to be home owners in two years time; 82% want to 
remain or become owners over the next ten years1 (Anderson, 2004).  
 
The factors underpinning this expansion of owner occupation into the dominant housing 
tenure in Britain do not need rehearsing here. What is worth considering is the way in which 
the tenure has been framed and reframed politically and culturally as the economic times have 
changed. In the early 1970s, for example, home owning might reasonably have been 
imagined, as Peter Saunders put it, as a form of ‘self-provisioning’, reducing households’ 
dependence on the state and increasing their autonomy (Saunders, 1990). But in the last 
quarter century, housing markets have been adjusting in far-reaching ways to a shift in the 
                                                 
1 In 1975 there was a much stronger aspiration to rent: 32% said they wanted to remain or become 
council renters over the next two years.  
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regulatory environment (which is described for the UK by Muellbauer & Murphy (1997) and 
set out more generally in Miles (1992)). Mortgage lenders, whose concern was once with 
product rationing, have been vigorously marketing their loans in an intensely competitive 
environment, and governments are looking to home purchase to provide (amongst other 
things) a route to social mobility. Some home-buyers have swapped dependence on the state 
for reliance on the market, and the UK population has effectively become a nation of small 
investors. Owner occupation is effectively populated by market actors who (for reasons, to an 
extent, and in ways, that remain to be documented) are competing against one another to 
secure the finance and protection they require in order to access to homes and 
neighbourhoods which – whatever other housing needs they do and do not meet – promise 
economic, educational and a host of other returns. And in some ways, it is the financial 
returns that have been most startling. 
 
Although house prices are notoriously volatile, there have been four phases of marked and 
sustained house price appreciation since 1970 (with peaks in 1973, 1979, 1989 and maybe 
2004), increasing the value of the owned stock to almost £3x1012 by the end of 2003. Indeed, 
the UK (together with Spain) topped the OECD league table for average annual increases in 
real house prices between 1971 and 20022. Between 1995 and 2002 the UK was one of only 
three OECD countries (the others being Ireland and the Netherlands) whose average annual 
increase exceeded eight per cent, and whose real rate of house price inflation (like that of only 
Spain and Ireland) averaged over three per cent per year. Since 2000 alone, prices have risen 
by 60% reaching an average of £161k by early 2004 (ODPM, Survey of Mortgage Lenders). 
Adjusting for inflation, these prices exceed the peak of the 1980s boom (Vass, 2004) and the 
wealth of many owner-occupiers is accumulating faster in their homes than through their 
incomes. HM Treasury (2003) now recognises that, as an investment, housing has performed 
particularly well for the UK, to the extent that, by the end of 2003, the average (median) 
home owner/buyer had, amongst their assets, as much as £56k of unmortgaged housing equity 
(Smith & Vass, 2004).  While the asset value of housing makes little overall difference to the 
wealth inequalities that divide a country Britain, figure 1 shows some intriguing trends.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 OECD countries referred to in this paper are the 18 included in the International Settlements’ 
residential property price database, plus New Zealand (see Catte, P., Girouard, N., Price, R. and 
Andre, C. (2004), 'Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle', OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper, 394.). 
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Figure 1: Housing wealth and the distribution of UK marketable wealth 1976-2001 
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Source: Social trends/ HM Treasury 
Note: Series 1 = marketable wealth excluding housing; Series 2 = including housing wealth 
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The two bar charts comprising figure 1 show that disparities in all wealth have only widened 
in the last quarter century. Whether in the form of housing or not, marketable wealth is 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the richest 10% (who own more than half) to the 
detriment of the least wealthy 50% (who own less than five per cent). More texture on the 
data to 2002 is provided by Paxton (2002). However, figure one also suggests that the 
distribution of housing wealth has an ameliorating effect on this polarisation. Between 1976 
and 2001, the top five wealth deciles increased their grip on non- housing assets by between 
4% (for the top 1 per cent) and 15% (for the top 10 per cent). But when housing assets are 
added to the mix, these increases are cut by between a half (for the top five per cent) and two 
thirds (for the top 25 and 50 per cent). Moreover, between 1976, when housing assets 
accounted for 30% of all marketable wealth, and the decade 1991-2001 (when housing assets 
increased their contribution by up to 10%)3 the effect of the distribution of housing wealth on 
the proportion of wealth held by the least wealthy changed direction. In 1976, while housing 
wealth detracted from the polarisation of wealth into the hands of the wealthiest 25% of the 
population, it marginally increased the concentration of assets into the top half of the wealth 
hierarchy (expanding the wealth holdings of the top fifty per cent from 88% to 92% of the 
total). In both 1991 (not shown in figure 1) and 2001, however, housing assets spread the 
distribution of wealth slightly further down the hierarchy in relative (though not absolute) 
terms (reducing the wealth holdings of the top fifty per cent from 97% to 95%).  Now that 
owner occupation has expanded to accommodate half the poor as well as most of the rich, and 
the value of the housing stock has once again been appreciating, the distribution of housing 
wealth is (in relative terms) marginally improving rather than substantially detracting from 
the position of the bottom half – indeed 3/4 – of the wealth hierarchy. 
 
Of course this ‘bottom three-quarters’ includes the majority of the population, in what is 
becoming a highly unequal society.  It has, moreover, long been recognised that differential 
house price appreciation  (reflecting differences in the desirability of locations or 
neighbourhoods, as well as variability in the character, condition and quality of the stock) 
helps exacerbate other kinds of inequality. Thomas & Dorling (2004) have recently presented 
a vivid reminder of this, showing that between 1993 and 2003, the housing wealth of the ‘best 
off’ ten per cent of areas rose ten times more than that in the ‘worst off’ ten per cent. This 
spatial and socio-economic unevenness in capital gain (together with the risk of capital loss) 
might, moreover, be amplified with the advent of what Graham (in press) calls the ‘software 
sorting’ of societies. In housing, this is the process by which geographical information and 
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geodemographic systems increasingly shape the production and consumption of 
neighbourhood ‘types’. This has considerable implications for the way people buy, sell and 
choose housing and therefore for housing market dynamics more generally (Burrows & 
Ellison, 2004). Certainly it raises the possibility that those who can will invest more in places 
whose past performance and current characteristics promise the highest rates of return. The 
scene is set for the ‘investor figure’ to eclipse the utility-seeking consumer and the home-
finder in the market for owner occupation.  
 
In short, the spread and accumulation of wealth through housing has enhanced the financial 
assets of a large proportion of British households over the last thirty years. This has slightly 
ameliorated wealth inequalities overall. But its effects are uneven across a range of 
dimensions. These socio-economic and generational differences in the acquisition, 
accumulation and loss of housing wealth, together with inequalities around race and gender, 
age and cohort, health and disability are currently less well attended to in British housing 
research than they once were. Moreover there is a risk that such inequalities will be amplified 
in the future in ways which are rarely documented and have yet to be fully understood. 
 
ii) The fungibility of housing wealth 
In addition to the growth in the size and value of the owned housing stock, the last decade has 
seen a steady increase in the options householders have to access their housing wealth. 
Housing assets, like life assurance and pension schemes, were once primarily a resource for 
older age, but of late they have begun to diverge in character from these other assets. Pension 
funds, in particular, are not easily accessible before retirement in the UK; housing wealth, on 
the other hand, increasingly is. In the last five years, especially, there has been a frenzy of 
product innovation in the mortgage market, introducing a wide range of new options which 
allow borrowers unprecedented access to housing assets in a context where spend against 
secured loans does not have to be accounted for (but does, of course, have to be paid for). 
This, as Aoki et al. (2001) point out, is a key reason why house prices matter for the UK 
economy. 
 
Among European countries, Britain pioneered the process of deregulation that increased the 
fungibility of housing wealth (Bridges et al., 2004), and the British public appear to have led 
the way in taking advantage of the opportunities it provides (HM Treasury, 2003). Even 
between 1979 and 1999 (ie before the most recent upturn in property values had fully 
established itself) overall mortgage equity withdrawal in the UK averaged three per cent of 
                                                                                                                                            
3 In 1991, housing wealth accounted for 40% of all marketable wealth. By 2001 this (having dipped) 
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household disposable income. This stands in sharp constrast to the position in France, 
Germany and Italy where the net flow consisted of injections into housing equity averaging 6 
per cent of household incomes. 
 
There are two main ways to release housing equity: disposing of it (through sale, by trading 
down or selling an inheritance), or borrowing against it, using financial products as the 
interface. Although, in any one year, less than 6% of home owners release any funds at all by 
any of these mechanisms (this may be a conservative estimate), this rises to about a third 
among those who have moved or remortgaged in the last five years (according to the recent 
Survey of English Housing).   
 
A distinction tends to be drawn in the literature (and in the character of financial products) 
between ‘equity release’ in which the repayment of extracted funds is deferred until a 
property is sold (usually on death, or on transition to residential care), and ‘equity 
withdrawal’, through loans paid back from an income stream over the lifetime of a mortgage. 
Equity release products (home reversion schemes or ‘lifetime mortgages’) are directed 
primarily to older home owners, and the growing potential of this market is clear (Terry & 
Leather, 2001); there is, after all, about £460bn of unmortgaged equity in homes owned by 
people over the age of 65 (J. Smith, 2004). However barely any of this wealth (less than .001 
per cent) has so far been extracted, and equity release products account for just 0.3% of the 
mortgage market by value. This may well change in future, but for the moment it places the 
spotlight firmly on the different forms of equity withdrawal that allow home buyers to tap into 
housing wealth earlier in the life course, perhaps drawing on it repeatedly as it accumulates 
over time. 
 
Trading down and last time sales are currently (and have historically been) the route by which 
the largest sums of equity are rolled out of housing, accounting for 60-64% of the total, by 
value (as measured in the Survey of English Housing for individual years (Benito & Power, 
2004) as well as across a five year period to 2003 (Smith & Vass, 2004)). However by far the 
majority of equity extraction events consist of either overmortgaging (one in five events) and/ 
or remortgaging or taking further advances against an existing mortgage (one in two equity 
extractions take this form). Both trading down and overmortgaging are facilitated  by the 
relatively low costs and (correspondingly) high rate of housing transactions in Britain (only 
the Netherlands and Ireland have a higher rate of transactions as a proportion of their owner 
occupied stock, and no country for which data are available has lower transactions costs). 
                                                                                                                                            
had climbed back to 36%, rising to 42% in 2001 (Social trends/ HM Treasury figures) 
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However, in the last five years an important new impetus for equity withdrawal has come 
from the introduction and enthusiastic take up of a new generation of flexible secured loans. 
These allow borrowers to tap into their housing wealth with relative ease, without having to 
sell and sometimes without incurring any other transaction cost at all. 
 
Equity withdrawal is now possible with virtually any mortgage product in at least three ways. 
Overmortgaging (1), or remortgaging in situ (2), are the traditional routes; more recently 
flexible features (3) built into a wide range of products, and often packaged as ‘flexible’, 
‘offset’ and ‘current account’ mortgages, have become much more common. These latter 
(flexible) products are particularly innovative in allowing funds to be as readily and routinely 
withdrawn from mortgages as invested into them (Duddleston, 2001; Smith et al., 2002). 
They radically lower the transactions costs (very broadly defined) of additional borrowing 
against housing equity, in ways which (Aoki et al., 2004) suggest tighten up the links between 
monetary policy and consumption. Most lenders now have some kind of flexible mortgage on 
their books, and flexibility is the second most frequently cited factor (after competitive 
interest rates) driving people’s choice of mortgage (CML Annual Mortgage Survey, 2003). 
(Mintel, 2004) estimate that the proportion of consumers holding the most flexible of these 
products – ‘all in one’ mortgages – has risen from 1 per cent in 2001 to 6% in 2004, making 
these products ‘a major growth area within the mortgage sector’.  
 
All this means that housing wealth is no longer a fixed asset; it is mobile in all kinds of ways. 
It can, for no more than the price of a phone call, or a visit to the cash machine, be spent on 
something as large as a new car or as small as a swimsuit. With nominal (though not real) 
interest rates reaching a 48-year low in 2003, and secured loans being so much cheaper than 
others, borrowing against the home has become an easy, obvious and cost-effective option for 
owner-occupiers to fund all kinds of spending. With estimates of unmortgaged housing equity 
now standing at £2.2 trillion, this is a significant resource. And while it might be handy for 
individual households, how it is used could have enormous significance for the economy. If 
all borrowers released as much equity as property values allowed, on the one hand, and as 
much as their incomes could sustain, on the other hand, consumer spending would increase 
dramatically, perhaps to the detriment of reinvestment in the housing infrastructure (see later). 
If, on the other hand, people put all their resources into paying off their mortgage, consumer 
spending could slump among those most responsible for making the high street thrive, and 
taxable savings would dwindle into non-existence. In the light of this, it is surprising how 
little information there is about households tendency or intention to tap into it their equity. 
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One useful data source is the Bank of England’s estimates of Mortgage Equity Withdrawal 
(MEW).4 Trends in MEW between 1970 and q2 for 2004 (the latest figures available at the 
time of writing) are shown in figure 2.5  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mortgage equity withdrawal as a percentage of post-tax 
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Low rates of MEW up to the early 1980s reflect the regulation and rationing of mortgage 
finance; negative figures in the early 1990s reflect falling house prices. At the other end of the 
scale, during the height of the rapid house price appreciation of the late 1980s, there were six, 
non consecutive, quarters during which MEW exceeded six per cent of post tax income 
amount UK borrowers. By mid 2004, in contrast, there had already been 8 consecutive 
quarters at this level, peaking at 8.8 in q3 for 2003, but still standing at 7.5 in q2 2004. In this 
latest phase, moreover, more than three times as much equity is routinely extracted as in the 
1980s. From these aggregate figures, then, the indication is that MEW is more significant for 
UK households now than it has ever been before. Other useful quantitative estimates can be 
extracted from a variety of surveys (tapping into households self-reported behaviour rather 
than relying on aggregate figures). These are documented, for example, by (Benito & Power, 
                                                 
4 See www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/mew/mew.htm  
5 The Bank of England figures take the increase in housing finance (net mortgage lending and capital 
grants) and subtracts from this households’ known investment in housing (purchases of new houses and 
houses from other sectors, improvements to property and the transactions costs of moving home).  
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2004; Davey & Earley, 2001; Ford et al., 2003; Smith and Vass, 2004; Smith et al., 2002). 
The broad generalisations are: that equity released through trading-down and last time sales 
may be saved rather than spent; and that while relatively modest sums, of around £20k are 
withdrawn at the point of remortgage or further advance, these sums are more likely to be 
spent than saved. Although these latter figures have been relatively stable in the past, the 
more prices (and underlying values) rise the more scope there is for the size of withdrawals to 
increase (Aoki et al., 2002). 
 
What is most striking from this literature is: first, just how high the potential is for equity 
withdrawal to form a routine part of households’ financial management; and second, how 
little is known about the way households approach these decisions, or about how they adjust 
their use of housing wealth to changes in the economy. Even less is known about the way 
different mortgage products, and related financial services, constrain and enable this process; 
or about how much people’s changing relationship with housing wealth affects their demand 
for different kinds of mortgages and financial advice. Some of these questions are being 
examined in a new project on ‘Banking on housing; spending the home’ funded as part of the 
ESRCs ‘Cultures of consumption’ programme, and the FSAs new programme of research on 
financial capability may also fill some of the gaps. Nevertheless, there is some way to go to 
build a comprehensive evidence base for this aspect of home ownership. 
 
iii) Changing political and social attitudes 
The traditional wisdom around the asset value of housing is that it accumulates over the life 
course, provides a cushion (in the form of low housing costs) for old age, and flows on to the 
next generation through inheritance.  This kind of investment is, from the perspective of 
households, primarily about spreading income across the life course. The average  (median) 
household spends around 17 per cent of disposable income meeting housing costs. Home 
buyers, in contrast, spend 23% while they are borrowing, in return for a median outlay of 10% 
of disposable income once the mortgage has been repaid (ODPM live tables 901: household 
expenditure on housing 2002/3). 
 
This traditional arrangement may, however, be changing. Politicians are now looking to 
housing wealth to meet a range of household expenditures, in particular to meet the costs of 
care in older age, and to supplement pensions. This view may also be spreading amongst 
householders. A recent qualitative study of older people’s housing trajectories in Scotland 
suggests that older home owners bought their homes more by accident than as a speculative 
investment at a time when there was much less to chose between owning and renting (Power, 
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2004). None of the three cohorts of older owners who participated in this research engaged 
much with the asset value of their homes. However, a study across a wider age band by CML 
and Hanover Housing Association shows that nearly half the home owners in three age 
cohorts (aged from 45 to 80) expect to access some of the equity in their homes in retirement. 
Those in their 40s and 50s are much more likely hold this view than those who have already 
retired. Less than half of this (40-50 year old) group want to leave their whole house as an 
inheritance, compared with more than two-thirds of the older owners (J. Smith, 2004). This is 
consistent with Henley and Disney’s ESRC-funded research which, by analysing the BHPS, 
showed that people under 40 in 1993 spent a larger proportion of the wealth they accumulated 
through housing between 1993 and 1999 than did those who were 55 and over. 
 
Additionally, a variety of surveys of current mortgage holders suggest that flexibility is a 
sought-after quality in mortgage products. So far this flexibility has mainly been exploited in 
the tendency to overpay (cutting costs and reducing the term of the mortgage); but where 
home buyers are specifically asked about their strategy, their stated intention is generally to 
make more use in future of the possibility to borrow back. Lenders are increasingly offering 
these borrow-back facilities, and at least some groups of borrowers may be increasingly 
inclined to seize on this, spending their equity today rather than saving it for tomorrow (Smith 
et al, 2002). The evidence currently available (which is not as full as it could be) suggests that 
the scene is set for more, rather than less, use to be made of the opportunity to use housing 
equity across the lifecourse. It may not, for long, remain a resource for old age, much less a 
component of inheritance. Rather it may be viewed as a store of wealth which can be made 
available to spend on other things. What happens in practice depends of course on the wider 
economy and its regulation: on interest rates, house prices and policy interventions; and on 
the monitoring and management of risk.  
 
 
Monitoring and managing risks 
 
Housing provision in Britain is now ‘marketised’ in a number of ways. Owner occupation has 
become the tenure de rigeur, both through the ‘commodification’ of social renting and in the 
patterning of newbuild and reuse of stock. But the style of owner occupation is also, and 
increasingly, distinctive, in particular with regard to the way it is financed and securitised. So 
whereas a high proportion of the high rates of owner occupation in some Southern European 
countries are financed by family wealth, and whereas in some former Eastern bloc countries 
very high rates of owning resulted from the mass transfer of state assets into private hands, in 
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the UK (as in most of the English speaking world) households rely on a stream of financial 
services to fund and sustain owner occupation. This links households’ money management 
(their strategies or behaviours around savings, spending and debt) directly into the world of 
international finance, fundamentally affecting the suite of risks to which households are 
exposed. This same shift in not just the extent but crucially the character of owner occupation 
also has macro-economic effects, so it has a bearing on systemic as well as individual risks 
and their management.  
 
It is tempting to think about these risks in terms of a range of different possible futures for the 
housing economy: what happens to interest rates; whether supply constraints are relaxed; 
whether prices rise or fall; whether trends are stable or volatile. However, these scenarios are 
in themselves ‘risk factors’ which stem from, and feed into, other individual and systemic 
risks in complex ways. The next section is therefore organised around types or sources of risk. 
Where appropriate some suggestions are made about the different impact of these risks under 
different future scenarios.  Although individual and systemic risks are intimately linked 
(Stephens (2004) has already made this point to the inquiry), they are considered separately 
here, not least because their causes and consequences are not always the same, and 
appropriate mitigation strategies are not necessarily compatible across these levels.   
 
Banking on housing: individual risks 
 
i) Exclusion and inequality 
Owner occupied property is, for many households, their biggest store of wealth as well as 
their main source of expenditure. To the extent that housing performs well as an investment, 
there are disbenefits – including financial risks – to non-owners, as well as to owners who are 
unable to borrow against, or access the equity in, their property.  
 
While the recent phase of house price inflation may have rewarded those already within the 
market, it has proved more exclusionary than the boom of the late 1980s. The Barker Review 
suggests that while 46% of new households could afford to buy in this earlier boom, by 2002 
only 37% of new households could gain entry to the market. Vass’s (2004) recent analysis 
similarly suggests that all aspects of affordability are beginning to worsen.  Disbenefits to 
renters relative to buyers include: higher housing outlays (the UK is the only country among 
nineteen reviewed by Scanlon & Whitehead (2004) where private renting is more expensive 
for younger households than home purchase); and being unable to ‘hide’ savings in mortgage 
accounts to exempt them from tax and – in some case – to qualify for housing related 
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benefits. Incurring tax liabilities against savings when comparable owners might not is 
particularly ironic if renters are saving with a view to entering owner occupation. 
 
There is also accumulating evidence that home buyers have access to a greater variety of 
sources of credit than renters. Exclusion from owner occupation compounds the risk of other 
kinds of financial exclusion because owner occupation weighs significantly in credit-scoring 
algorithms. Thus owner/buyers have better access than renters to higher levels of unsecured 
credit (such as credit cards). Bridges et al., (2004) show further that home ownership is used 
as a screening or signalling device for some kinds of credit but not others, thus affecting the 
portfolio of assets and the magnitude of debt in different tenure sectors as well as for different 
levels of housing wealth. In particular the unsecured borrowing available to renters might be 
more expensive and have less favourable (and more punitive) terms and conditions attached 
than that available to owners. The increasing ‘software sorting’ by location (Burrows and 
Ellison, 2004; Graham, 2004) is likely to make this more fine grained and increasingly 
neighbourhood specific, exacerbating inequalities within owner occupation as well as across 
tenure sectors. 
 
As well as the risk of exclusion from home ownership, there are risks associated with the 
degree of inequality within that sector. Thomas and Dorling (2004) have put the spotlight on 
this in their report for the charity Shelter, showing, for example, that the ten per cent of 
children who (as a consequence of their parents’ housing attainment) are the most housing-
asset-rich have seven times more housing wealth at their disposal as the least wealthy ten per 
cent. There are other inequalities too. There is, for example, unevenness in practice in who, 
among owner-buyers, can and does borrow against their home. Cox et al., (2002) show that 
while indebtedness (relative to incomes) among the most indebted ten per cent of owner 
occupiers fell between 1995 and 2000, it did so against a background of increasing levels of 
(relatively costly) unsecured borrowing. This is in marked contrast to the least indebted 70 per 
cent, whose levels of indebtedness all increased and did so more noticeably (especially among 
the least indebted percentiles) through secured than unsecured loans. In short, those who are 
better off and have most housing wealth can borrow larger sums more cheaply. 
 
Benito and Power (2004) also show (using data from the 2003 Survey of English Housing) 
that although equity withdrawal through last time sales and trading down is equally spread 
across income groups, borrowing against property (the commonest form of equity withdrawal, 
though it only accounts for about 40% of MEW by value) is concentrated among higher 
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income groups.6 Housing wealth can, in theory, facilitate access to reasonably priced credit 
for liquidity constrained households – flexible mortgages, for example, might provide some 
safety net for borrowers whose income stream is interrupted (Smith & Ford, 2002).  However, 
this may currently be its least likely application. Housing wealth may, in the end, provide the 
best buffer against shocks in the economy to those households who least need it.  
 
ii) Indebtedness 
The flip side of speculating to accumulate in housing, or even of accessing housing wealth as 
a safety net, is the suite of risks associated with indebtedness. By 2001, 69% of British 
households were owner-occupiers, and in the decade 1992-2002 the debt required to finance 
this doubled (Mintel 2004) rising from 56% to 64% of GDP (Catte et al., 2004). Though other 
estimates are a little lower – around 60% of GDP – British mortgage debt is one of the highest 
in the developed world, exceeded only by Denmark (74%) and the Netherlands (79%). Not 
surprisingly, mortgages account for by far the majority of household debt in the UK, and 
rising property values (combined with sustained levels of employment) permit households to 
increase this as they go along (Aoki et al., 2002). As a result, owners are far more indebted 
than renters (May et al., 2004). Furthermore, aggregate levels of secured debt relative to 
income have tripled since 1980 (Hamilton 2003) and they rose from 95% to 125% of post-tax 
income in the five years to 2004 (Hancock and Wood, 2004). Mortgage debt now accounts for 
three quarters of UK households’ total interest-bearing liabilities (HM Treasury, 2003).  
 
Analysing the BHPS, Cox et al. (2002) show that, among mortgage holders, the most 
indebted households (by value of debt) are those with the highest gross assets (those with big 
mortgages have the most valuable homes). Because of this, in 2000 at least, positive net 
housing equity was more than sufficient to offset non-housing debts for most groups of 
households. The effectiveness of this safety net depends, of course, on home buyers being 
able to liquidise their assets if they need to, which is not always the case if unemployment 
rises and markets stagnate. Additionally, the widespread preference for variable rate loans in 
the UK (an average of 65% of mortgages held between 2000 and 2002 were of this type) 
makes borrowers here uniquely vulnerable to a change in short-term interest rates (Miles, 
2004). Currently, it is this risk that dominates discussion. Employment in the UK is at an all-
time high and for most (though not all) commentators, the outlook seems robust. Interest rates 
on the other hand are still relatively low (they averaged 5% between 2000 and 2004, in 
contrast to 7% in the 1990s and 11% in the 1970s and 1980s), though it is not clear whether 
and to what extent they might rise in the medium term.  Even if they do, there may be some 
                                                 
6 Nearly 25% of owner occupying households earning over £40k have over-mortgaged, remortgaged  
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protective effect in the UK’s medium loan-to-value lending rates, which typically 
approximate to the EU norm of 60-80%, even though100% loans are available (HM Treasury, 
2003).7 However even (perhaps especially) in a benign economic climate – even if 
unemployment and interest rates both stay low – highly indebted borrowers (in a setting 
where the average house price to earnings ratio is now 5.7, exceeding its 1980s peak) remain 
vulnerable to the financial consequences of biographical disruptions of all kind. These include 
relationship breakdown, ill-health and premature death of a mortgagor, against which, so far, 
neither state nor private safety nets offer a comprehensive protection package (Easterlow and 
Smith, 2004; Ford et al., 2003) 
 
Moreover, as well as having loans secured against their home, owners have the possibility to 
engage in a wider range of unsecured borrowings than renters (and some mortgages come 
with an unsecured top up taking some borrowers over the 100% loan-to-value maximum). 
Owners are twice as likely as renters to have a credit or charge card, for example, and more 
likely to have borrowings against any cards they do have (Bridges et al., 2004). They are also 
more likely to have unsecured personal loans of other kinds. Home ownership thus enhances 
the possibility for households to acquire unsecured debt, and one of the risks this brings is 
‘debt overhang’ – where total borrowings exceed the value of all assets, including those in 
housing – particularly if house prices remain volatile and property values fall. Since the 
probability of owing money on unsecured loans decreases as housing equity increases, the 
highest risks may be incurred by those who are already most indebted (people with lower 
incomes, or people who stretched themselves to make their most recent home purchase).  
 
Although the debt to income ratio in the UK has increased dramatically since 2000, to reach 
over 130% by mid 2004 (Bank of England figures) the consensus in the literature is that, 
overall, the risks around indebtedness are not excessive. Neither Smith and Vass (2004) using 
the Survey of English Housing, nor Bridges et al. (2004) using the BHPS, nor May et al. 
(2004) reporting on a recent Bank  of England survey, nor Hancock and Wood (2004) 
commenting on first time buyers, regard the risks associated with market entry, equity 
extraction or unsecured borrowing by home buyers as serious in the short term. All note that a 
small minority may be more at risk than others. On the whole, though, Bridges et al. show 
that while higher equity withdrawal between 1993 and 2001 is associated with increasing 
unsecured debt, this is only true to levels of about £27k, after which the association breaks 
                                                                                                                                            
or secured a further advance, compared to just 3.5% of households earning less than £10k. 
7 With a median in 2003 of 89% for first time buyers and 70% for movers (Scanlon, K. and 
Whitehead, C. (2004), International trends in housing tenure and mortgage finance, London, Council 
of Mortgage Lenders.). 
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down. They therefore attribute the majority of equity extraction to ‘consumption smoothing’ 
across the life course ‘which should not be a cause for concern’ (p. 39). Smith and Vass 
(2004), furthermore, expose a financial cushion in the housing wealth of the average home 
buyer which could withstand a fall of up to 10 per cent in house prices. This is reflected in the 
UKs historically low rates of possessions which, in the first half of 2004, were numerically at 
their lowest since 1982, and lowest since 1973 when measured as a proportion of all 
mortgages (CML, 2004). More recent figures are slightly more circumspect, flagging a small 
increase in arrears which might feed a modest upturn in possessions (CML, 2005). Thinking 
ahead ten years, however, it seems unlikely that the climate for home ownership can continue 
to improve. In which case households with all their financial eggs in the property basket may 
find themselves at risk. 
 
iii) Narrow investment portfolio  
Risk in relation to home ownership is usually thought of in terms of the probabilities of 
possession as a consequence of over-indebtedness. The risks of low returns on housing 
investments – the pitfalls of concentrating wealth into an asset which performs badly – are 
less well appreciated (outside the rather specific case of capital loss and negative equity after 
the 1980s boom). However, Britain is distinctive in the high proportion of personal wealth  - 
62% - which is concentrated in homes (Banks et al., 2002). The notorious volatility of house 
prices (discussed below as a systemic risk) may therefore impact on individuals by increasing 
investment risk in the short and medium terms, even if housing wealth accumulates steadily in 
the long term (a prediction which itself presumes no overall shift to a deflationary 
environment).  
 
In other settings (notably the USA, where only a third of household wealth is held as home 
equity) explanations for such concentration as does occur are usually the flip side of 
explanations for low rates of investment in stocks and shares (e.g. Frantantoni, 1998). Such 
accounts tend to suggest that one risky investment (housing) is as much as most households 
can bear. In Britain, however, the concentration of investment into owner-occupation may 
have a rather different explanation. The Association of British Insurer’s (2003) review of the 
state of the nation’s savings suggests that people invest in domestic property because they 
view it as a reliable store of wealth. Research commissioned by the Financial Services 
Authority also consistently suggests that consumers believe domestic property to be a 
relatively risk-free investment, with a good rate of return. Although the high volatility in 
British house prices may not entirely support this view, its popular tenacity may explain 
Banks et al’s (2004) contention that owner occupied housing is an exception to the ‘rule’ that 
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risk averse individuals avoid risky assets as price volatility increases (some other explanations 
are considered by Nordvik, 2001). 
 
One effect of volatility, in fact, may be to accelerate the entry of first time buyers into the 
market (as a hedge against future prices rises or exclusion). This partly accounts for the 
relatively high (if declining) rates of owner occupation among younger age groups in Britain 
compared, for example, to the USA (Banks et al., 2002).8 One benefit of early entry is getting 
onto the housing ladder at all (and potentially accumulating wealth as prices rise); a disbenefit 
is the lack of funds to invest elsewhere. This may include an aversion to funding social goods, 
which in turn could have knock on effects into public support for welfare expenditure. 
Schmidt (1989), for example, found a negative correlation between rates of home ownership 
and national spending on social protection, and Boelhouwer et al. (2004) suggest that buyers 
cannot sustain both their housing costs and the high rates of taxation that a welfare economy 
demands. Ironically, while low social protection may be one consequence of high house 
prices, it may also fuel price rises as people turn to housing investment to create a personal 
safety net knowing that collective measures are on the wane.  
 
Whatever the social implications, it is clear that financially there is only one other private 
investment, in addition to home purchase, for the average British household: their pension. 
Although the impact of poor stock market performance on pension funds has turned political 
and public attention to housing wealth as way of funding retirement, a recent CML/ Hanover 
Housing Assiociation study finds no evidence so far of a wholesale shift of investment from 
pensions into property. There is, however, a greater tendency among younger cohorts of 
working owners to say they will rely on property as both a main and a second source of 
retirement income (J. Smith 2004). This ‘funds for retirement’ use of housing wealth is 
consistent with Benito and Power’s (2004) analysis of the Survey of English Housing which 
indicates that the largest stream of released equity (extracted through trading down and last 
time sales) is more likely to be saved for the future than spent. Certainly among the younger 
age groups in J. Smith’s (2004) analysis, property/home equity is identified more often than 
other investments (apart from routine savings) as being important for funding older age.  
 
Over the next two decades, rates of owner occupation may increase among the over-65s in 
Britain from around 65 per cent to as much as 80 per cent. Since outright owners have a 
                                                 
8 Rates of home purchase are more than ten per cent higher among 20-39 years olds in Britain than in 
the USA (Banks, J., Blundell, R., Oldfield, Z. and Smith, J.P. (2004), 'Housing wealth over the life 
cycle in the presence of house price volatility', National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.). 
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virtual income stream from housing it might reasonably be suggested that older owners can 
manage on smaller pensions. Indeed there may be evidence across EU member states that 
accumulating housing wealth has effectively funded a wave of early retirement (Doling and 
Horsewood, 2003). However, whether and to what extent housing wealth can reliably be 
regarded as a retirement fund depends: first, on house prices reliably keeping pace with 
inflation; and second on the extent to which housing equity has already been mined to fund 
other things9. British households have a wide range of risks to manage with the wealth they 
have, and few of these risks can be deferred to older age.  These risks include: loss of income 
through illness or unemployment (this is the most frequently cited risk of owning among 
mortgage holders interviewed in the Mori Financial Survey for 2003) or through relationship 
breakdown; increased outgoings demanded by interest rate rises, the costs of maintenance, 
repair and insurance, the expense of living with illness, and others.  
 
Ironically, just as the fact of being an owner enhances access to some kinds of credit in the 
marketplace, so it may diminish access to some kinds of social benefit. There is a separate 
paper in this series on the implications of owning for access to a range of means-tested (and 
other) benefits. However, to the extent that owner-buyers are made dependent on the market 
to meet a range of welfare needs, it might be argued that the typical British household, and 
certainly the average owner-occupier, has a too-narrow investment portfolio. Even ordinary 
savings rates are low in the UK compared to the rest of Europe, and declining. From a high of 
10% of post-tax income in 1990, savings rates fell to 4% by mid-2000 (Davey, 2001) so that 
British households save at less than half the rate of their French counterparts (though this is 
still nearly twice the rate of US citizens).  
 
Some analysts argue that concentrating wealth into housing is a wise strategy; that it is more 
profitable and less risky than investing in portfolios consisting only of monetary assets (see 
Wullkopf 2002). And there is an extent to which the narrowness of home buyers’ investment 
portfolio in the UK has paid off. Over the long term, HM treasury (2003) estimates that there 
is a real rise in house prices of about 2.5% per year; and in the last decade housing has 
performed especially well as an investment. Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) illustrate 
this using London as an example. Here, they argue, even households with limited wealth are 
better off owning their home than they would be by renting and investing in other assets, as 
long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. And these risks do exist (even in 
the context of an overall appreciating market) and are unevenly spread. Henley (1999) for 
                                                 
9 It also depends on the viability of equity release products which are commercially  attractive without 
putting older households at risk; a challenge considered by Terry, R. and Leather, P. (2001), The 
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example challenges  the idea that the 1980s boom produced a big redistribution of wealth to 
the middle aged in SE England. He makes the point that there were winners and losers across 
the board (see also Hamnett, 1999). Likewise, Disney et al. (2002) show that although the 
average home owner made a real housing gain of over £20k between 1993 and 1999, almost 
one in six owners experienced a real fall in their housing assets in this period. This kind of 
inequality has prompted Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) to argue that poorer (as well as 
better off) homeowners could reduce their exposure to this kind of risk if they were given 
access to housing price derivatives. 
 
On the other hand, between their peak in 1989 and the bottom of the most recent recession in 
1994, average house prices fell by 30%, wiping out over £33 billion of housing wealth 
(Henley & Disney, n.d). A fall of this magnitude casts real doubt over the extent to which the 
asset value of home ownership can consistently or reliably be harnessed to welfare ends. The 
unequal effects of such volatility also questions the idea that widespread housing wealth 
reduces the need for some kinds of social protection. This raises important questions (which 
are taken up later) not just over what proportion of households, and the nation’s wealth, is 
invested in housing, but how much should be allowed to accumulate there. 
 
One of the most rehearsed aspects of the asset value of home ownership revolves around the 
distinction between consumption and investment issues (especially for policy purposes). It is 
usually argued the favourable tax treatment of owner occupation reflects its positioning as a 
consumption rather than an investment good (so there are no capital gains or imputed rents for 
primary residences). However, it could equally be argued that the way housing is treated for 
taxation purposes (gains are not taxed, losses are not recoverable against tax) is neither about 
consumption nor investment, but rather about the profit and loss in gambling. One of the few 
recent qualitative studies of housing transactions in the UK shows that in the experience of 
buyers and sellers, and, to some extent, in that of professional intermediaries, housing gains 
are more like winning the lottery than accruing interest on savings or dividends on shares. 
The findings of this research redefine ‘bubbles of speculation’ as an economy of desperation 
and show just how random the gains and losses of housing investment are from a 
householders’ perspective (see Smith, 2005; Smith et al. forthcoming). Buyers themselves use 
gambling metaphors to account for their purchase: no wonder bookmakers are finding a 
market for spread-betting on housing, encouraging gamblers to ‘profit from market volatility, 
or hedge the value of your own property’.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
market for equity release schemes, London, Council of Mortgage Lenders. 
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The rise and rise of owner occupation: systemic risks 
 
i) Volatility 
Recently, ‘volatility’ has become more of a buzz-word than ‘sustainability’ in the housing 
policy community. House prices are surprisingly and notoriously volatile, especially in the 
UK, which is one of only four OECD countries (with Italy, Spain and Finland) whose 
standard deviation of annual percentage changes in house prices between 1971 and 2002 
exceeded ten per cent (Catte et al., 2004).10 Banks et al. (2004) argue that volatility increases 
demand, and feeds itself, as buyers who might have rented are prompted to enter the market 
in a setting where ‘insuring [against] the risk of house price rises is more important than 
avoiding the risk of a house price fall’ (p. 9). One result is that prices are higher overall in the 
most volatile markets, with the consequence that younger households may be drawn into 
buying earlier, and into larger properties (presumably with higher levels of debt), than they 
otherwise would.  
 
But higher prices overall is not the only, or even the main, risk associated with volatility. 
Housing markets have an important economic role and although (as noted earlier) volatility 
may be risky for individuals, it is also problematic at a systemic level because of its 
interaction with broader aspects of economic management: its impact on financial sector 
soundness, its implications for labour markets and its consequences for consumer protection 
in the mortgage market (Hilbers et al., 2001; Laslett et al., 2001). Price volatility influences 
the speed and magnitude with which monetary policy responses to ‘shocks’ are transmitted 
though economies and it has the potential to create macroeconomic imbalances.  HM 
Treasury (2003) is therefore concerned that any instability in housing markets may be 
translated into instability in economic activity more generally, and Barker (2004) argues that 
this has already created problems both for business and economic policy makers.11 
 
There is some debate around the particularity of UK house price volatility, but there is little 
doubt that it is on the high side of average. Moreover, while a number of European countries 
experience substantial volatility in prices, these cycles do not appear to be synchronised (HM 
Treasury, 2003). So it is likely that local (national) factors have a key role to play. In the UK 
                                                 
10 Though puzzlingly, using data labelled ‘average percentage deviation of real house price from trend 
1970-2001’ for eleven European countries, Bridges et al. (2004) only identifies France as having levels 
less than 10 per cent. This measure is highest in the Netherlands (25%) with the UK in the middle 
(15%). See Bridges, S., Disney, R. and Henley, A. (2004), 'Housing wealth and the accumulation of 
financial debt: evidence from UK households', in Bertola, G., Disney, R. and Grant, C. (eds.), The 
economics of consumer credit, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
11 Barrell et al. (2003) are more cautious, arguing that the impact of a ten per cent fall in house prices 
today would have fewer systemic effects than they did in 1989.  
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policy arena the favoured explanations for price volatility currently hinge around housing 
supply issues, on the one hand, and the nature of the mortgage market, on the other. These are 
dealt with, respectively, in the Barker and Miles reviews,  so only a brief note is required 
here.  
 
On the question of supply, the distinctively low responsiveness of housing supply to demand 
in the UK is a critical issue (HM Treasury, 2003; Barker, 2004). Low levels of investment in 
housing supply may fuel house price cycles as people buy earlier and pay more as a hedge 
against exclusion. Although enhancing supply is unlikely to be a cure-all for price volality, 
attending to supply issues has a sufficiently wide range of additional social, as well as 
economic, benefits to place it high on the policy agenda for the medium term. 
  
Volatility may also be rooted in the mortgage environment. As many as 60% of UK 
mortgages are interest-sensitive variable rate loans; no other European country matches this – 
Italy comes closest with 35%. This may have knock on effects into price fluctuations, and it 
also means that households’ disposable incomes, as well as their ability to service debts, are 
over-exposed to interest rate variations. Whether this reliance on variable rate (as well as 
short term fixed rate) mortgages feeds into price volatility overall is less certain: a 
comparative analysis of the UK and the Netherlands (where longer term fixed rate mortgages 
are more common) finds little to support this (HM treasury, 2003). Nevertheless, Miles 
(2004) argues that if borrowers could be persuaded to look to the medium term risks that are 
associated with variable rate loans (rather than to immediate housing outlays) they might 
choose longer term fixed rates, and this might reduce volatility. [Though this neat formula 
may overlook the extent to which it is the longer term savings in interest payments that often 
attract households to flexible variable rate mortgages, even though the short term cost might 
be a slightly higher interest rate] 
 
There are, of course, other factors encouraging price volatility. Muellbauer and Murphy 
(1997) attribute volatility to high gearing permitted by lenders, low transactions costs, and a 
history of positive investment returns. Reflecting on the strong growth in MEW in the 1980s 
Westaway (1993) argues that this was fuelled by a stream of ‘quasi-consumer credit’ which 
itself made the housing market more volatile than it might otherwise have been. Westaway 
thus attributes price volatility to credit-based effects which might merit more attention than 
they so far have in the current economic and policy environment. Whatever the cause, there is 
a general consensus that price volatility is a key systemic risk even though (and perhaps 
because) it is difficult to account for and even harder to predict. 
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ii) Sustainability 
The expansion of owner occupation in the UK has been achieved primarily by a shift 
‘downmarket’: people who once looked to renting on account of both their incomes and their 
other housing (especially health-related) needs are now home buyers (Smith et al., 2004). 
Boelhouwer et al. (2004) have argued that this movement into the market of households 
whose incomes are relatively low, and whose only financial asset is their home, may make 
sustainable housing markets hard to achieve. Relying on lower income groups to maintain 
high levels of home ownership, especially against a background of steadily rising prices, is 
certainly risky for a national housing policy founded on the growth of sustainable owner 
occupation.  
 
A range of issues around sustainability which are pertinent to this enquiry have already been 
set out by Meen (2004), who identifies and elaborates on the many dimensions of this term. 
There is also a fairly well established literature on the (limits to) sustainability for owner 
occupation which probably does not need restating here. One further issue for this enquiry, 
however, is the extent to which strategies to promote sustainability of any kind can work in a 
policy environment which increasingly discriminates between owners and renters. This is, 
after all, a time when – among lower income groups at least – the socio-economic and 
housing needs profiles of owners and renters are increasingly similar. Donna Easterlow and I 
have reviewed this policy disjunction elsewhere, in relation to the project of housing for 
health, and in terms of social welfare more generally (Easterlow & Smith, 2004; Smith & 
Easterlow, 2004). We draw attention especially to the very different demands made on, and 
requirements extracted from, the providers of social and of private housing. We question the 
government’s presumption that, because owned housing is an asset, the responsibility for 
maintaining this asset (its quality, condition and repair) is an individual rather than a 
collective obligation. There are risks here both for the longer term environmental quality of 
the owner occupied housing stock (which is taken up later) and for the more immediate 
affordability of owner occupation.  
 
iii) Bonanza! Or, the dematerialisation of housing equity 
During the housing bonanza of the 1980s local authorities cashed in as the sale of council 
housing netted more than all the other early eighties privatisations put together. This in itself 
is a useful reminder of the extent to which the asset value of owned homes, while it may be 
increasingly privatised, individualised and economised, is also a major national, collective 
and social resource. Owned housing may be an investment and an asset for households, but it 
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is also – and increasingly – relied on to fulfill a range of human needs and provide a stream of 
services that are important for social welfare. Perhaps the major systemic risk associated with 
the future of home ownership is the risk of failing to strike a balance between these functions 
for the housing stock. This may be thought of as the risk of another kind of ‘bonanza’ – a  
one-off diversion of housing wealth not from the state to the market but from the housing 
stock into other things.  
 
There has always been some concern about the possibility of housing equity ‘leaking’ into 
other areas of the economy. Prior to the financial deregulations of the 1980s this was a minor 
consideration, not least because it formed a tiny proportion of personal disposable income. 
What concern there was at this time centred on the extent to which it might constrain housing 
market activity (Westaway, 1993).  
 
Before the termination of MIRAS there was also discussion about the dangers of giving tax-
relief to non-housing expenditure fuelled by mortgage finance (a benefit which might, for 
example, have encouraged overmortgaging to fund other kind of spending). While this 
particular risk may have been addressed with the phasing out of MIRAS, there is surprisingly 
little attention given by the Treasury, or by other government departments, to other 
inconsistencies in the treatment of housing investments. These include exemption from tax on 
savings for those whose debt is in the form of a mortgage (as mortgages and savings accounts 
become effectively indistinguishable across a wide range of products) and eligibility for 
means-tested benefits such as ISMI which can, theoretically, be achieved (where earned 
incomes are sufficiently low) by ‘hiding’ savings in mortgage accounts (Smith and Ford, 
2003). Even less concern is evinced over the extent to which established home buyers, 
amazed by the way their properties have appreciated in value, may have turned to mortgage 
borrowing to service other debts, meet welfare needs, or fulfill consumption desires. Perhaps 
this does not matter. The systemic risk, however, is that there is more potential now than there 
has ever been before to divert equity out of the housing stock into places – beyond as well as 
within the UK – where it can no longer be used maintain the quality, condition and future 
standards of owner occupation.  
 
It is, of course, still early days to be judging the effects of the flexible mortgage products 
which encourage households routinely to roll money in and out of their property. Economists 
remain largely locked into the discovery that, notwithstanding the rational assumptions built 
into Franco Modigliani’s ‘life cycle hypothesis of saving’, households continue to store up 
their assets into older age, rather than running them down towards the end of their life. This 
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tendency has, of course, been particularly marked in relation to housing assets, which have 
traditionally been fixed, and have formed the major component of most home buyers’ legacy 
to the next generation. But at a time when even governments are looking to housing wealth 
not only as an insurance policy for later life, but for other kinds of securities, there may be a 
case for attending more carefully to the question of what happens to the considerable amount 
of housing equity that can be withdrawn, even as it accumulates, across the life course. One 
possibility here is that far from being concerned about such ‘leakage’ governments may be 
forced to encourage it, in order to stimulate demand in economies that can no longer rely on 
boosting social wages to achieve this end. 
 
Economic analysts often find it difficult to account for the translation of housing wealth into 
consumer behaviour (Lantz & Sate, 2001). While some data suggest that a growing 
proportion of consumer spending is fuelled by housing equity (Aoki et al., 2002; Boone et al., 
2001), other estimates are less clear cut (Benito and Power, 2004), and some analyses suggest 
that price volatility discourages refinancing to fund non-housing consumption (Banks et al., 
2004). Nevertheless, there is a strong theoretical case to support the argument that the 
deregulation of the financial sectors of most OECD countries has led to a rapid expansion of 
credit and that this has eased households’ liquidity constraints and boosted consumption 
above the levels expected from incomes alone. There is, moreover, some evidence to suggest 
that this is particularly true for the UK.   
 
Britain has always been a place where buoyant housing markets and high street spending go 
hand in hand (Hamnett, 1999), and there is a close relationship between house prices and 
consumption of durable goods (Aoki et al., 2002). Indeed, the UK shows the strongest 
correlation between private consumption growth and real house price changes of any OECD 
country between 1970 and 2002; and it is one of just four OECD countries which show a long 
run relationship between equity withdrawal and consumption (Girouard & Blondal, 2001). It 
is one of five countries (with Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the US) where housing 
wealth effects on consumption exceed those of financial wealth effects, and it is unique in 
exhibiting the effects across the short as well as long run (Boone et al., 2001). This same 
study shows that the ‘housing wealth effect’ is entirely accounted for (statistically at any rate) 
by housing equity withdrawal. It is not, therefore, surprising that a recent round up of 
evidence by HM Treasury (2003) suggests that the sensitivity of household spending to house 
prices and housing wealth is higher in the UK than elsewhere. Even in the past, when such 
wealth was generally notional (‘you have to live somewhere’), consumer spending tended to 
increase with the belief that house prices are appreciating (Maclennan & Tu, 1998). However, 
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the increased fungibility of housing wealth means not only that people may feel richer in a 
period of house price appreciation, but that they can readily roll their capital gain out of 
housing and into other things. And, whereas until quite recently, the main trigger for such 
‘rolling-out’ was residential mobility, the rise of in situ refinancing and flexible mortgages, 
means that this need no longer be a significant constraint. 
 
There is undoubtedly a wide range of financial and material benefits (as well as risks) to 
home buyers in all this. But there are some notable systemic risks too. One is that this level of 
spending against housing equity is to an extent a one-off. Even if property prices appreciate 
over time, some heroic assumptions would be needed to allow their asset value both to be 
drawn on today to provide a safety next against unemployment, or to fund education or boost 
high street consumption, and relied on tomorrow to supplement pensions or fund health and 
social care. A second risk is that so much flexibility in how housing wealth is spent may come 
at the expense of reinvestment in the housing stock. 
 
The government is clear that the responsibility for maintaining the quality and condition of 
the owned housing stock rests with individual households, precisely because owned homes 
are a financial asset as well as a housing service. The general consensus, however, is that only 
about half the gross equity release from housing is reinvested in the stock. This is confirmed 
in recent analyses based on the SEH (Benito and Power, 2004), who found that half those 
who withdrew equity spent it on home improvements.  
 
There is a tendency to view this figure with some satisfaction: as much as half the flow of 
equity out of housing is reinvested into the stock. But this means that at least half (and 
probably more where the most flexible mortgages are concerned12), flows into other things. 
And there is at the moment no clear sense of whether or not this matters. There are no targets 
set for reinvestment, no warnings or guidelines issued to householders about how to spend 
their housing wealth, and – especially when prices are rising rapidly – no effective penalities 
in the housing market for failing to keep the property up to scratch. ‘Quality, condition, 
repair’ does not have the same ring as ‘location, location, location’ in the world of estate 
agency. The advent of sellers packs is unlikely to change this substantially (though it will at 
least raise sellers’ awareness of what they may need to attend to prior to moving on), 
                                                 
12 Among those interviewed in a recent survey of flexible mortgage holders – i.e. among borrowers 
choosing the kind of mortgage designed to make equity release easier – only one in three of those who 
withdrew any equity spent it on their home. Two thirds used it to service other debts or to buy treats 
and luxuries. See Smith, S.J., Ford, J. and Munro, M. (2002), A review of flexible mortgages, 
London, Council of Mortgage Lenders.. 
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especially in a ‘changing rooms’ culture whose signifiers for adding value rarely connect with 
the kind of investment needed to safeguard and regenerate the stock13.  
 
And what of the fifty per cent of equity that is, apparently, reinvested? Nearly all our 
knowledge of this comes either from gross estimates based on aggregate figures, or from a 
relatively small amount of questionnaire survey data in which, at best, spend on home repairs, 
renovations and extensions are one of half a dozen ‘tick box’ responses. Notwithstanding the 
important work completed by Phil Leather, Moira Munro and others in the ESRC beliefs and 
behaviours programme there is nothing of note in the literature concerning householders’ 
knowledge, capabilities, and inclinations to use housing wealth to secure the long term quality 
and condition of their home.  
 
The point here is that, whether as a means of funding consumption preferences, or as a way to 
meet key financial needs, the accumulation of wealth through owner occupation has the 
potential to allow significant leakage of housing equity out of the housing infrastructure and 
into other areas. People have an incentive to grow the market – to build up their housing 
wealth – precisely because of this. This is partly why the price of housing in the UK is so 
high.14 As a consequence, however, the whole system may lean towards short term revenue 
rather than long-run regeneration; towards individual financial gain and individual risk 
mitigation rather than towards social or environmental sustainability. The wider range of 
concerns this raises are set out in (S. Smith, 2004). A key question is whether from a systemic 
perspective it is wise to encourage or allow so much personal wealth to be invested in 
housing. Once there it certainly cannot, in the current policy environment at least, be 
guaranteed to be used in the way policy makers anticipate or hope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 For example property programmers  identified ‘GLAMS’ (gorgeous lifestyle accessory must-haves, 
such as espresso machines and plasma TV screens) as third in the top ‘Twenty quickest ways to make 
money on your property’ (Channel 5, 5.11.2004). Installing appropriate GLAMS can, they claim, add 
as much as £15k to the sale price of the average home. This is nearly three times as much as the gain 
from adding a WC, twice as much as from installing a new kitchen, and a third more than the value 
added by painting and cleaning! 
14 Banks, J., Blundell, R. and Smith, J.P. (2002), 'Wealth portfolios in the UK and the US', NBER 
Working Papers, Cambridge, Massachusetts., for example, show that even in the mid 1990s, the 
median value of a home in the UK exceeded that in the US by as much as 14%. 
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Mitigating risk 
 
The way the owner occupied housing market currently works undoubtedly has benefits for 
individuals and for the economy, but is also has the potential both to unsettle wider economic 
trends, and to expose vulnerable households disproportionately to the effects of this. While it 
is tempting to assume that strategies to mitigate systemic and individual risk are one and the 
same, this is not necessarily the case, particularly given the dominant wisdom about how 
global markets and local housing systems work. There are, of course, some common building 
blocks: boosting inclusion (growing the market overall and widening its wealth effects); 
dampening volatility (stabilising the economy and enhancing equity in the distribution of 
housing gains and losses); managing indebtedness (securing the viability of lending, as well 
as the wellbeing of households); and safeguarding the future of the housing stock (protecting 
households’ investments and securing a viable housing service for UK residents). However, 
while systemic risks within the prevailing political economy may best be tackled by one 
model of risk-mitigation (incremental, evolutionary change in the interests of better business 
as usual), an adequate response to the changing nature, magnitude, and consequences of 
individual or household risks might demand a rather different approach. Reconciling these 
models could change the nature of owner occupation in some quite fundamental ways.  
 
i) Business as usual: the evolutionary approach 
The ‘business as usual’ strategy for minimising the risks of owner occupation assumes that 
the building blocks for an affordable, sustainable housing market are in place. What is 
needed, if anything, is for financial consumers to ‘catch up’ with the implications of 
deregulation, and in particular to improve their financial literacy and capabilities in order to 
keep pace with the growing range and diversity of financial services available to them.  
 
This view certainly seems reasonable from a mortgage market perspective. The UK (together 
with Denmark and the Netherlands) has one of the most ‘complete’ mortgage markets in 
Europe, judged by the variety of products on offer, the range of borrowers served and low 
mortgage interest rate spreads (Catte et al., 2004). According to the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders, taking into account the accessibility of mortgage finance and the availability of 
information and advice, the UK tops the completeness table (Anderson, 2004).  David Miles’ 
(2004) review of the UK mortgage market thus refers tellingly to its strengths, and finds no 
evidence that it is deeply flawed. There is indeed a general consensus summed up by Laslett 
et al (2001) that: ‘the mortgage market as a whole is mature, liberalised and stable’; what 
policy concerns there are thus form a patchwork around the difficulties facing ‘some classes 
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of borrower’ (p. 22). Thus it is that half of David Miles’ recommendations focus on ways to 
improve the advice and information that borrowers receive, and on the importance of creating 
a fairer more transparent pricing structure to enable borrowers more effectively to judge the 
costs and risks of different mortgage products. Even then, the aim is to ensure that any 
changes ‘reflect the current best practice of lenders and financial advisers’ (p. 3). The main 
issue, it seems, is how to share this existing expertise across the market place. The reasoning 
underpinning this is that ‘Monetary policy will be easier to manage if households make well-
informed decisions about mortgage products that are priced in a transparent and sustainable 
way and where the risks of different types of mortgage are well-understood’ (p. 4). 
 
So one strategy is to use incremental change to make the market as it is work better. Such 
strategies, according to Laslett et al. (2001) ‘must not impede the functioning of markets’ and 
‘should be targetted on specific goals of preventing speculative bubbles, achieving greater 
regional price stabilisation and protecting vulnerable borrowers’ (p. v). To achieve this, these 
authors, like Miles, place considerable emphasis on information disclosure and consumer 
education. This same impetus lies behind the Financial Service Authority’s drive to document 
and enhance the public’s financial capabilities now that it has responsibility for the regulation 
of mortgage as well as insurance products.  
 
This ‘knowledge plus capabilities approach’ does not, of course, directly or entirely address 
recent declines in the overall affordability of owner occupation (Vass, 2004), although this is 
tackled to some extent in Miles’ (2004) second group of recommendations. These outline 
ways to reduce the costs to lenders of managing risk, enabling them to offer a wider range of 
lower interest rate, longer fixed term, mortgages. This would, Miles argues, both boost 
affordability and enhance the sustainability of home purchase. If combined with greater 
accessibility to, and use of, the range of mortgage payment protection products now on the 
market, this might be regarded as a constructive way to minimise the risks and maximise the 
benefits of owner occupation over the short, medium and longer terms. What this line of 
reasoning draws attention to in particular is the importance of state guarantees in risk 
mitigation in the mortgage market. Interestingly, these guarantees generally protect lenders 
rather than borrowers, ostensibly to encourage them to lend to higher risk groups. Lenders 
servicing the highest risk groups – the subprime market – may additionally be protected by a 
process of securitisation, which effectively transfers the risk to investors. 
 
The ‘evolutionary’ model of risk mitigation is a two pronged strategy whose success hinges 
on educating borrowers (to enhance their financial skills) and protecting lenders within a 
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framework of ‘fair and responsible’ lending. This all seems reasonable: a necessary part of 
reform.  But it may not provide a sufficient framework for mitigating risks, for at least two 
sets of reasons. 
 
First, the capabilities approach to financial services seems at odds with a wider literature on 
consumption: the same home buyers are regarded as ‘duped debtors’ on the one hand and 
competent, calculating, customers on the other. Undoubtedly it is less interesting to most 
buyers to follow the small print on a mortgage application than it is to follow the instructions 
to link their read/write DVD player to a plasma screen tv without upsetting its internet 
connection. But is it that much more difficult? There is certainly a role for consumer 
protection whether new technologies, durable goods or financial products are up for sale. The 
mortgage maze is as complex as any, and more challenging than many, product ranges, and it 
may well be due for a consumer-friendly overhaul. But it seems unlikely that ignorance, 
incompetence or inadequacy is the sole, or even the main, reason why borrowers are at risk; 
and it may be equally unlikely that education or capability enhancement is a sufficient route 
to mitigation. Certainly there are other policy arenas (health education, accident prevention, 
environmental management, for example) in which this strategy has been tried and found 
wanting (see, for example, Roberts et al., 1995). Lay knowledge usually proves to be more 
extensive and sophisticated than educators expect. Equally, recent work in economic 
psychology – and in other disciplines too – indicates just how complex the link between 
knowledge and behaviour can be. 
 
Second, it is possible that the nature of the risks facing British owner/buyers has changed 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively in the last quarter century, demanding radical rather 
than incremental approaches to risk mitigation. Mortgage markets may be nationally inclined 
but the viability of lending institutions is increasingly tied into international finance and there 
are limits to what states can do to manage this. On the other hand there may be more options 
than governments typically recognise for states to protect social welfare even as households’ 
strategies for managing savings and debts are themselves exposed to the vagaries of the 
international economy (see Smith and Easterlow, 2004 for some ideas). Certainly there may 
be scope to develop more direct measures to mitigate the risks to individuals; supporting 
households might be as big a boost to lending as protecting lenders from risky individuals. 
There is a case too that some of these measures might be implemented by an alliance of 
business interests and state institutions: that more might realistically be asked of ‘the market’ 
without jeopardising the economy. 
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Third, a particular form of owner occupation accommodates most people in the English-
speaking world. How this element of the housing market works is generally taken for granted; 
attention is paid to what it achieves for owners (on the one hand) and to the challenge of 
mitigating its uneven and unequal effects (on the other). When market failure seems to have 
no market solution the social sector is brought into play. The possibility that ‘the market’ for 
homes might be different in any fundamental way – that the bottom line for markets my be 
defined ethically and socially as well as financially, for example – is therefore rarely 
entertained. Yet, while a certain inertia on these points might be expected among politicians 
and policy makers, it is increasingly hard to justify in the research community. Here, the 
question of what markets are and how they work is coming under its most intense scrutiny for 
nearly a hundred years. Mitigating the risks traditionally associated with owner occupation 
takes an interesting turn when it is tied to a more wide-ranging rethink of markets of all kinds, 
and of housing markets in particular (a point I have tried to develop in Smith, 2005).  
 
ii) Towards a care-full market? 
It is traditional in policy circles to distinguish the role of markets ‘which work’ as price 
driven distributive mechanisms, from the interventions of a state ‘which cares’ for those 
whose needs cannot be catered to commercially at prices they can afford. This distinction is 
more than evident in British housing policy, where the government has recently been active in 
promoting welfare-orientated housing environments in the relatively small social rented 
sector, while using the mantra ‘market solutions to market failures’ to inform policies for the 
private sector. More thought-provoking still is the attempt to introduce some of the most 
appealing aspects of market provisioning to social tenants (choice based lettings, for example 
as well equity shares). Reviewing these trends, Donna Easterlow and I have made the 
following point: 
 
‘It is striking that no attempt has been made to bridge the tenure divide in the other 
direction; none of the merits of distributing resources according to need have been 
transferred into the private sector… Rather than extending an ethos of care by infusing 
the institutions of the market with some demonstrably effective social practices, it could 
be argued that these policies are transferring a competitive individualism from the market 
into spaces once celebrated for their social concern’ (2004 p. 1013) 
 
There may, nevertheless, be a case for challenging this trend; for mitigating the risks of home 
ownership precisely by drawing from Britain’s unique store of experience in using housing 
interventions to meet social aims and applying it to the world of owner occupation. Certainly 
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it may be worth considering whether housing policy asks and expects too little of ‘the market’ 
precisely because its sphere of operation and modus vivendi is too often taken for granted. 
 
One option is to boost inclusion in (and thereby to redefine the nature of)  ‘home ownership’ 
through a more flexible and less discriminatory approach to tenure. An ESRC funded study of 
housing for health, focussing on the home ownership experiences of people experiencing ill-
health, called for greater flexibility in housing tenure, enabling renters to become part-owners 
and owners to become part-renters as needs and circumstances change (Smith and Easterlow, 
2002, 2004). The idea of introducing a sliding scale of equity shares and promoting the 
development of intermediate tenures is currently under consideration by the council of 
mortgage lenders, as are a range of other schemes for improving flexibility in housing 
markets (Hoyle, 2004). These could usefully draw from Britain’s growing experience of 
shared ownership, rent-to-mortgage and mortgage-to-rent schemes (see also Bramley, 2004). 
This flexibility might be used to allow a wider range of households to benefit from the wealth 
effect of owner occupation, but it might also be developed to allow home buyers access to the 
welfare protections that are routinely built into social renting.  
 
On the one hand, this would require a rethink of how mortgage lending works. Daphnis & 
Ferguson (2004) draw attention to the poor fit between traditional mortgage financing (geared 
to large loans over the long term) and the needs and financial capabilities of lower income 
borrowers (who may prefer smaller loans with shorter repayment periods which are not so 
heavily collateralised as traditional mortgages).15 They also build an interesting case for 
drawing the microfinance revolution that has swept some developing economies into the 
provision of affordable, sustainable accommodation for poorer people in every type of world 
region including the USA. In addition to improving the accessibility and sustainability of 
home ownership, this approach could also help secure the quality and condition of the stock 
by facilitating maintenance and repair. 
 
On the other hand, there are more radical regulatory and interventionist options that could be 
considered. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) have argued that a reform of property taxes may 
be essential to manage systemic risks around price volatilty. Although the CML may not 
favour (Anderson, 2004), it could contain some  exciting possibilities. Westaway (1993), who 
                                                 
15 Improving this fit might be criticised as a move towards two-tier mortgage lending, but it is unlikely 
to be any more divisive than the current system in which the wide range of sophisticated products and 
services available to higher income buyers is increasingly detached from the more restricted range of 
products (often with predatory conditions attached to them) available in the ‘subprime’ lending market.  
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attributed price volatility in the 1980s-90s to credit based effects has already argued for 
regulation to control the extent of over-mortgaging. It might be a short step from this to 
developing other measure to limit the amount of wealth stored in homes, allowing it to be 
diverted into other less individualised uses (including individual as well as social safety nets). 
In auction-based systems (the Scottish system being the archetype) prices paid in excess of 
property values could, for example, be diverted into a housing infrastructure fund and used to 
fund maintenance and repairs for low income owners. More radical still is the challenge of 
institutionalising an ethic of care – which is concerned with the interdependency of 
households and communities – into market practices which currently prize competitive 
individualism and private gain. Most of the risks to individuals documented in this report are 
effectively the risks that come from the individualisation of housing wealth, and of the losses 
as well as the gains which may arise from this. While challenging this may seem beyond the 
remit of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s enquiry, it would equally be out of step for a 
‘think-tank’ on home ownership to ignore the struggle to reclaim markets for social ends 
which is now appearing in literatures from international political economy to science and 
technology studies, from the sociology of finance to the world of economic geography, from 
political philosophy to grass roots practice.  
 
 
Looking Forward 
 
Documenting, predicting and recommending what happens to home ownership between now 
and 2015 is of critical importance for the economy of the UK and for the wellbeing of 
households within and outside that tenure sector. Running through the different sections of 
this review is an indication that at least three areas of understanding might usefully be 
enhanced as a preface to securing a more inclusive, less risky, world of home ownership by 
2010. 
 
First, while the challenge of monitoring and measuring the housing economy is usually the 
remit of housing economists, the findings of this review point to the gains to be made from a 
more wide ranging transdisciplinary approach. There is scope for much more conversation 
between housing economists and other social researchers concerned with the economy of 
owner occupation. At the moment, for example, there is a division of labour between 
economic description and prediction for whole (national, regional or local) systems, on the 
one hand, and social critique, prescription and protection for the most vulnerable households 
on the other. This leaves little real energy for debate around some important themes 
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concerning price expectations and values, information and calculation, investment and 
consumption, and so on across the board. It leaves some core ideas driving housing decisions 
and transactions relatively unexplored, especially as far as their social, cultural and ethical 
dimensions are concerned. Yet housing studies is better placed than many other subjects to 
encourage the transfer of knowledge and ideas across a disciplinary divide (between social 
and economic research) which has often been unhelpfully entrenched. Any initiative designed 
to bring together housing economists and other social and environmental researchers 
exploring the economy of housing could address this gap in the interests of securing a 
sustainable future for the management of home ownership. 
 
Second, there is currently far too little knowledge about the way home owning households – 
as occupants, as the consumers of financial services, as recipients of safety net services – 
routinely behave, and too little comprehensive understanding of what they want and need 
from home ownership. Lay perspectives on housing policies and practices around home 
ownership are few and far between,16 and even economic psychology still has some way to go 
in this area. There is, therefore, too little ‘close dialogue’ to underpin, challenge, or revise the 
dominant ‘sylised facts’ which are currently assumed to drive housing decisions. Moreover, 
when lay perspectives are drawn into the system, it is usually by way of qualitative interviews 
or focus groups providing illustrative experiences, or feedback on the terminology and 
language in product literature or in questionnaire survey design. There is enormous scope 
when considering the future of home ownership not only to develop a wider range of 
participatory research techniques (building on a tradition which JRF has traditionally 
favoured) but also to bring lay voices more fully into decision making processes. A recent 
attempt to apply ‘citizens jury’ techniques to complex debates on life insurance and genetic 
testing shows not only that a random cross section of citizens can get to grips with complex 
ideas in a relatively short space of time, but also that they are willing to work with subjects 
that hardly seem scintillating (how insurance underwriting works, for example!) if they feel 
the work is worthwhile (Bennett & Smith, 2005).   
 
Finally, some intriguing and thought-provoking findings are now coming on stream from new 
data sources containing a longitudinal perspective on ownership experiences. While these fill 
some notable gaps, housing issues are often incidental rather than fundamental to the large 
panel surveys. As a consequence there is still too little life course data in the system. In 
particular there are too few opportunities to recognise and document the implications of a 
                                                 
16 Though a new project on the Origins of Security and Insecurity (OSIS) funded under the EU 6th 
framework programme ‘Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society’ may address some of 
these concerns 
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cohort effect, or of intergenerational impacts, when analysing the consequences of economic 
and policy shifts for ownership options, asset accumulation, savings, spending and debt. A 
panel survey of homebuyers would offer one solution to this rather glaring gap in the 
knowledge base underpinning the policies and practices shaping owner occupation as the 21st 
century unfolds.  
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